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VOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING ARGUMENTS (EDAs) have 
attracted extensive attention in recent metaethics, as they pose an 
important challenge to moral realism (see FitzPatrick (2016) for an 
overview). EDAs “move from a premise about the influence of evolutionary 
forces on our moral beliefs to a skeptical conclusion about those beliefs” 
(Vavova (2015)). In a recent paper, Andreas Mogensen (2015) suggests that 
such a move is in fact illicit: explanations of the kind that evolution supplies 
– so-called ultimate explanations – have no debunking potential. Rather, what 
matters for the debate over moral realism are so-called proximate explanations. 
Proponents of EDAs, claims Mogensen, simply confuse the two sorts of ex-
planation. Once this confusion is cleared up, the moral realist can safely ac-
cept the premises of an EDA without being forced to accept its conclusion.  
If this critique (unpacked below) is correct, it has considerable im-
portance for the debate: EDAs turn out to be invalid, and so realists simply 
need not worry about them. But we believe that the dialectical situation is 
more delicate and complex than Mogensen implies. It is certainly helpful to 
bring the proximate/ultimate distinction into the picture, but the upshot of 
doing so is not the dismissal of EDAs. This is because a reconstructed EDA 
can be formulated that takes the distinction into account. Indeed, we believe 
this formulation may reflect better the key idea underlying extant EDAs. 
However, as we go on to suggest, once this more sophisticated reconstruc-
tion is on the table, a further, more serious issue arises for the aspiring de-
bunker. 
 
1. 
 
There are various versions of EDA, but they all share broadly the same struc-
ture: 
 
1. Our tendency to form the moral beliefs we actually tend to form is explained 
by evolution through natural selection. 
2. Natural selection would not have favored moral belief-forming mechanisms 
that are truth-tracking. 
3. Our moral beliefs are generally off track with respect to moral truths (even if 
such truths exist). [1,2] 
 
  
E 
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Therefore, 
 
4. The justification for our moral beliefs is systematically defeated.1 
 
Much of the debate here revolves around premise 2 and its implications. 
The rationale for this premise runs like this: natural selection explains the 
traits of organisms by showing how they contributed to the survival and re-
production of their ancestors. It is fairly easy to see how an organism’s sur-
vival and reproduction might be positively affected by its having certain par-
ticular moral beliefs, e.g., that it should reciprocate altruistic behavior or care 
for its offspring. But it is unclear how an organism’s survival and reproduc-
tion could be affected by whether such beliefs are (mind-independently) true 
or not.2 It is this truth-indifference of evolutionary explanations of human mo-
rality that purportedly has debunking implications: if the origins of our moral 
beliefs are explained in a truth-indifferent fashion, suggest advocates of 
EDAs, we should be skeptical of the idea that they track moral truths. 
With this in mind, let us say a few words about the proximate/ultimate 
distinction. Originally introduced by the biologist and philosopher Ernst 
Mayr (1961), it is a distinction between two types of causal explanation, per-
taining to two related but distinct explananda. Ultimate explanations pertain to 
the long-run genealogical processes via which certain organisms came to 
have a certain trait. Proximate explanations, on the other hand, pertain to the 
short-run, developmental and physiological processes in virtue of which ex-
tant organisms have the traits they have. Mayr used the example of bird mi-
gration to illustrate: an ultimate explanation of why certain birds display mi-
gratory behavior cites the ways in which spending different seasons in differ-
ent locations was advantageous to the birds’ ancestors. It would describe dif-
ferences in food availability, climate, etc., and weigh these against the dangers 
of predation, fatigue and other costs of migration. In contrast, the corre-
sponding proximate explanation pertains to how birds migrate in the here 
and now – how birds learn a particular flyway, how they “know” when to 
migrate and so on. 
  
                                                
1 As noted, this general structure is fleshed out differently by different authors. For example, 
Street (2006) argues that our dispositions to form certain moral beliefs were shaped by selec-
tion pressures that would not have favored a capacity to track moral truths. This would make 
it an extraordinary coincidence if our moral beliefs happen to track moral truths. Hence, we 
are not justified in supposing that our moral beliefs track such truths. And a somewhat dif-
ferent EDA, due to Joyce (2006), has it that a complete genealogy of how our capacity to 
make moral judgments evolved need not cite moral truths, rendering moral truths explanato-
rily superfluous and hence discredited. But such differences will matter little for the present 
discussion. 
2 For brevity, the rationale for premise 2 given in the text is illustrated only in terms of some 
(particular) moral beliefs we tend to form. Parallel illustrations could be given for different 
elements of our moral psychology, such as moral concepts, which serve as the target for 
some EDAs. 
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2. 
 
Enter Mogensen’s critique. In support of premise 2, proponents of EDAs 
rely on the truth-indifference of ultimate processes – namely the irrelevance, 
with respect to fitness, of the truth-value of our ancestors’ moral beliefs. But 
“we can’t infer that moral facts do not explain our moral beliefs simply be-
cause beliefs of that kind have evolved as a result of truth-indifferent selec-
tion pressures. Those who draw this conclusion are confusing proximate and 
ultimate causes” (Mogensen 2015: 202). 
Mogensen’s key claim, then, is that proponents of EDAs are confused 
about the kind of biological explanation their argument requires. Even if 
truth-indifferent forces led to the survival and reproduction of our ancestors, 
this does not rule out the possibility that extant humans like us reliably rec-
ognize moral truths – via reasoning, deliberation, moral perception, intuition 
or some other method(s) – and form moral beliefs accordingly. That a capac-
ity to recognize moral truths need not be invoked to (ultimately) explain the 
evolution of human morality does not imply that we lack such a capacity and do 
not exercise it in (proximately) forming moral beliefs. The debunker cannot 
derive conclusions about proximate mechanisms merely by appeal to evolu-
tion. 
As noted, this critique is potentially quite important: if debunking argu-
ments commit a simple fallacy, then realists are off the hook. Moreover, 
since the critique turns on confusing the proximate with the ultimate – a per-
fectly general conceptual point that is not specific to the debunking of morali-
ty – it would seem to block the use of debunking arguments in other areas 
where they have been raised, such as religion and mathematics (Bergman and 
Kain (2014); Wilkins and Griffiths (2012)). Is this indeed the case? 
 
3. 
 
No doubt the logical point underlying Mogensen’s critique is correct: ulti-
mate and proximate explanations are conceptually distinct, and assumptions 
about the former do not strictly entail conclusions about the latter. Neverthe-
less, there are important connections between them (Laland et al. (2011)). 
Taking these connections into account will allow us to set out an improved 
EDA – one that escapes Mogensen’s criticism and reveals interesting new 
questions about the biological assumptions that must be in place for the de-
bunking threat to sting. 
The most important connection for present purposes is evidential: in-
formation regarding ultimate causes can tell for or against specific hypotheses 
about proximate causes. This is because ancestors pass on their traits, via 
genes and other forms of inheritance, to their descendants. In other words, 
ultimate conditions have, in part, shaped proximate mechanisms, and can 
therefore provide evidence about them. To illustrate, recall Mayr’s bird mi-
gration example. Suppose one is studying the Swainson’s thrush, a migratory 
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bird that breeds in colder areas of North America and winters in Central and 
South America. And suppose one knows that this bird’s migratory behavior 
evolved at a time when climate differences between North and Central 
America were much less pronounced than they are today. This would make it 
unlikely that the thrushes are rigidly “programmed” to fly from northern to 
southern parts of America and back. A more plausible hypothesis is that the 
birds can track differences in climate and adjust their flyway accordingly. 
Here, information about the evolution of the thrush’s migratory behavior (an 
ultimate explanation) serves as evidence supporting our understanding of 
how it chooses particular migratory patterns (a proximate explanation).  
We suggest EDAs can and should be understood as implicitly relying on 
a similar evidential connection between ultimate and proximate claims. To be 
sure, proponents of EDAs typically fail to explicitly acknowledge this point. 
Still, the proximate/ultimate distinction can be readily incorporated into a 
faithful reconstruction of their argument that is entirely in keeping with its 
intended spirit, and yields the same conclusion. The basic form of reasoning 
would run parallel to the case of bird migration: moral realists countenance a 
proximate claim, viz., that human moral beliefs tend to track moral truths. To 
determine whether this claim is plausible, we turn to an ultimate explanation 
as a source of evidence. Champions of EDAs suggest that, given the selec-
tion pressures at work in shaping our moral psychology, it is highly unlikely 
that ancestral humans developed a capacity to track moral truths. Assuming 
that we present-day humans have inherited our moral belief-forming mecha-
nisms from our ancestors, it is highly unlikely that we have mechanisms that 
tend to track moral truths, either.  
Note that the reasoning here is ampliative – the ultimate story makes the 
proximate conclusion more likely, but falls short of entailing it. This raises 
the question of how well the ultimate story actually supports the corresponding 
proximate story.3 We will come back to this important point shortly. For 
now, however, our claim is simply that an EDA can be formulated more co-
gently by taking into account the evidential connection between ultimate and 
proximate explanations: 
 
1. Our ancestors’ tendency to form the moral beliefs they actually tended to form 
is explained by natural selection. 
2. Natural selection would not have favored moral belief-forming mechanisms 
that are truth-tracking. 
3. Our ancestors’ moral beliefs were generally off track with respect to moral 
truths. [1, 2] 
4. Our own belief-forming mechanisms are inherited from our ancestors. 
5. Our own moral beliefs are likely to be generally off track with respect to moral 
truths [3, 4]. 
 
  
                                                
3 For a related discussion, see FitzPatrick (2014). 
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Therefore, 
 
6. The justification for our moral beliefs is systematically defeated.  
 
Thus, Mogensen is right that ultimate explanations do not strictly entail 
claims about proximate mechanisms. But his critique ignores important evi-
dential connections between the ultimate and the proximate. Consequently, it 
also ignores the way in which a reconstructed EDA can substantiate a claim 
regarding proximate belief-forming mechanisms by relying on a plausible ul-
timate story about their origins. However, the reconstruction brings out fur-
ther issues that bear significantly on the prospects of EDAs. In closing, we 
outline one such issue.  
 
4. 
 
Framing EDAs as we have done, in terms of an ultimate explanation that 
provides evidential support for a proximate claim, naturally raises the ques-
tion of how strong the support in fact is. This question is hard to settle, not 
least because very little of the extensive literature on EDAs actually spells out 
a detailed ultimate story about human morality.4 One point that bears directly 
on the question of strength of the evidential support concerns what we shall 
label “flexibility.” As our reconstruction above makes clear, EDAs implicitly 
assume that our belief-forming mechanisms are inherited, so that we present-
day humans are heirs to the effects of natural selection on our ancestors. 
Now, there is a tendency in many contexts to regard inherited, evolved traits 
as inflexible – i.e., to take whatever is “in our genes” as impervious to exter-
nal, environmental influences. We believe this thought is presupposed, in one 
way or another, by many of those writing on EDAs. The issue deserves a 
more extensive discussion than we can devote to it here, but we shall com-
ment on it briefly.  
The fact that a trait is an evolutionary adaptation does not imply that it is 
insensitive to external, environmental circumstances. Indeed, many evolved 
traits are highly sensitive to the environment. This point has been empha-
sized by writers on innateness (e.g., Griffiths (2002)), who provide a wealth 
of examples. To pick an especially simple case (drawn from Lewontin 
(1983)): the number of light-receptor cells in the eye of a fruit fly under ordi-
nary conditions is about 1,000. But this number varies widely depending on 
the temperature in which the fly develops. At 15C⁰ it goes up to 1,100, while 
at 30C⁰ it goes down to 750. This type of flexibility seems at least as relevant 
when it comes to psychological phenomena: while natural selection often 
“instills” certain behaviors and cognitive tendencies, this need not result in 
                                                
4 Joyce (2006, ch. 4) is a partial exception. Machery and Mallon (2010) explicitly assess the 
plausibility of ultimate explanations, but engage mainly with the empirical question of 
whether and how human morality evolved, and only briefly with EDAs proper. We address 
this issue more comprehensively in (Levy and Levy, (in prep)). 
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the behavior or cognitive tendency being insensitive to environmental (e.g., 
social) inputs. The point may matter quite a bit for assessing EDAs: even if 
there is an evolution-by-natural-selection story to be told about human moral 
psychology, and even if that story suggests that we have evolved to make 
fairly specific moral judgments, and even if those fairly specific moral judg-
ments are formed in a truth-indifferent way – it is still possible that, given the 
right kind of environment, we tend to revise our judgments in a way that 
aligns with moral truths. In this way, ultimate explanations, while remaining 
highly relevant for assessing proximate claims, may nevertheless leave con-
siderable room for proximate flexibility. Aspiring debunkers and moral real-
ists would then have to work out whether such flexibility could suffice to re-
store confidence in our ability to track moral truths.5 
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5 We thank Uri Leibowitz for very useful comments on an earlier draft. 
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